

Future Gas Market Dynamics in Europe: is it all about Russian pipeline gas versus US LNG?

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
IAEE Conference, Singapore, June 20, 2017



AGENDA

- **Europe: can the gas demand recovery of 2015/16 be sustained?**
- **‘Security’: perceptions and reality**
- **Gazprom pipeline gas versus US LNG: competitive positions**
- **Different time frames**

Gas Demand in 31 European Countries 2010-2016 (bcm)




Honoré: OIES (forthcoming)

2016 saw first non-temperature corrected increase in demand since 2008; demand in 2014 was back at early 1990s levels




European Gas Demand by Country 2014-16 (Bcm)



Source: Honoré/OIES

Many countries increased their demand but some did not eg Turkey and some central/eastern countries

Clean spark spreads in four major EU markets and electricity generation from natural gas in the EU28 (Euro/MWh and TWh)




Source: Honoré/OIES

As coal prices increased and gas prices fell in 2016, so CCGTs came into the money, especially in UK which has a high carbon support price

IEA '450 Scenario': European Gas Demand 2020-40

Source: Honoré/OIES using data from IEA, World Energy Outlooks, 2010-16



If COP 21 targets are going to be achieved, demand decline is modest for the next decade but very significant post 2030

European Gas Security: perception versus reality

PERCEPTION: Russia is the major problem of European gas security:
For many Europeans: Gas = Gazprom/Putin = Bad: this is generally presented as an `energy/gas security problem' but in many cases is a metaphor for Russophobia/Putinphobia ie national/military security

REALITY:

- European gas production is declining – by 2030 European gas production will be ~100 Bcm (43%) less than in 2014; low gas prices may mean this happens faster than anticipated; new production likely to be uncompetitive at low gas prices
- Diversification of pipeline gas has failed:
 - ❖ North Africa: export prospects are poor
 - ❖ Southern Corridor: 16 Bcm west of Turkey in the early 2020s is maximum (and could be less)
 - ❖ East Mediterranean: political gridlock
 - ❖ European shale gas: failed – politically toxic
- LNG can disappear in the 2020s if Asia needs it



Projected conventional gas production decline 2016-2030 (Bcm)

Sources: IEA, National statistics and Honoré/OIES


	2016	2020	2030
Norway	122	100 (87-111)	75 (57-90)
UK	41	34	20
Netherlands	53	38 (33-42)	26 (20-30)
Other	40	40	25
Total	256	212 (194-227)	146 (122-165)
Norway / UK / NL (share of total)	84%	81%	82%

Norwegian, Dutch and UK will continue to dominate European conventional gas production, which will decline **29-62 bcm** (about 17% in the “mean” scenario) by 2020 compared to 2016 and by **91-134 bcm** (about 43% in the “mean” scenario) by 2030

DUTCH DECLINE COULD BE FAR MORE RAPID THAN SHOWN HERE

Gazprom has a surplus of gas, mainly targeting Europe

Source: Henderson/OIES



- Russia's total supply capacity to western markets is c.750-800bcm
- Western demand for Russian gas = 620bcm (excluding sales from Sakhalin)
- Independent production is dedicated to domestic market or specific LNG projects
- Gazprom therefore has a shut-in gas production of around 100 Bcm which has been largely created by its decision to invest in the Yamal peninsula during the mid-2000s
- As the majority of the investment has already been made, the gas can be priced down to short run marginal cost if necessary



Gazprom Pipeline Gas Exports to Europe 2011-2016 (Bcm)

	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Western Europe	115.9	111.4	133.6	126.8	130.0	146.3
Eastern* Europe	40.7	39.6	40.8	32.6	28.6	33.0
Baltic States	5.1	4.8	4.2	3.9	4.0	2.6
Total (Group)	161.7	155.8	178.5	163.3	188.4	228.3
Total LTC**	150.0	138.8	161.5	146.6	158.6	179.3

*Includes "other countries" which rose to 5-6 Bcm in 2014-15; **volumes exported under long term contracts by Gazprom Export excluding Baltic states. Sources: Regional totals are sum of individual countries exports from Gazprom in Figures 2010-14, pp.82-3 and 2011-2015, pp.81-2. Gazprom Annual Report 2014, p.49 and 77. 2016 data from Gazprom Press Conference June 2017.

2016 was a record year for Russian gas exports

Nord Stream & Nord Stream 2 Pipelines



Source: OIES

Nord Stream: 55 bcm (in two strings): operational since 2011-12

Nord Stream 2: 55 bcm (in two strings): scheduled ~Q4 2019

Nord Stream 2 faces formidable political and regulatory obstacles making the 2020 start date unlikely (but not impossible)



The Turkish Stream Pipelines


Source: OIES




**First pipeline will start laying imminently, completion by end-2019 likely;
2nd pipeline depends on EU regulation and pipeline capacity options**

Russian Gas Can Be Very Competitive With US LNG in Europe

Russian pipeline gas versus US LNG at SRMC



Full comparison of Russian and US gas to Europe




Source: Henderson/OIES

- On a short-run marginal cost basis (SRMC) the key variables are the US\$/Rouble exchange rate and the price of Henry Hub gas
- At current price levels Russian gas can compete with, and slightly undercut, US (and all except Qatari) LNG in Europe
- Longer term, Russia would logically adopt a strategy to keep the European gas price between the short and long-run cost of US LNG - \$4-8/mmbtu



LOW COMMERCIAL ATTRACTIVENESS OF U.S. LNG SUPPLIES TO EUROPE

Estimated price range* for U.S. LNG supplies in Europe versus forward prices** in European gas market




In current environment, forward contract prices at European trading platforms do not cover full cost of future U.S. LNG supplies linked to Henry Hub prices

* Based on Henry Hub forward prices, $P = HH * 115\% + X$, where X – costs (liquefaction, shipments, regasification)
 ** NBP forward prices
 *** Historical data: Russian gas prices, including delivery, at German border (according to World Bank), projected data: based on current forward prices of Brent and TTF
 Sources: Bloomberg, Cheniere Energy, WoodMackenzie, World Bank



But there will be a lot of new LNG on the water in the next few years



Source: Rogers/OIES



So not Russian Gas Versus US LNG but Russian Gas Versus LNG

KEY ISSUES FOR NEXT 5 YEARS ARE:

- Demand (price) development – not just in power, but also industrial residential, transport(?) sectors
- Domestic supply decline – especially Netherlands
- Timing/reliability/competitiveness of LNG projects under construction which will impact...
- How long the perceived global LNG surplus will continue





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